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The past decade and a half has seen an absolute explosion of literature discussing the 
structure of reality. One particular focus here has been on the fundamental. However, while 
there has been extensive discussion, numerous fundamental questions about fundamentality 
have not been touched upon. In this paper, I focus on one such lacuna that emerges when we 
consider the interaction between fundamentality and modality, about the modal strength of 
fundamentality. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the idea that the 
fundamentalia are only contingently fundamental – or, put in property-terms, that the 
property of being fundamental is not a (weakly) necessary property (where a property is 
weakly necessary iff the things that has the property do so in every world in which they 
exist).
1
 Call this claim the contingent fundamentality thesis. While I think this thesis is 
plausible – indeed, as I show later, it lurks in the unexamined shadows/assumptions of some 
fairly prominent positions – as far as I can tell, nothing has been said about it. Here, I hope to 
fix this by giving the thesis a proper airing. In this way, this paper represents a first-pass at 
exploring not only the modal status of fundamentality, but also offers a starting point for 
examining broader issues about the relationship between fundamentality and modality.  
In particular, after fixing some preliminaries (§1), I’ll discuss (§2) three reasons for 
taking the contingent fundamentality thesis seriously. I then evaluate some objections (§3) 
intended to show that taking fundamentality to be contingent is wrong-headed; I argue that 
these objections can be dealt with, leaving the contingent fundamentality thesis at least prima 
facie plausible. I then look at how the thesis relates to views about the possibility of 
contingently existing fundamentalia (§4), pulling some of the various packages apart, and 
making the case for adopting what I call the Shifty Shaky view. I then conclude (§5) by 
indicating further areas about the thesis ripe for fruitful future exploration. 
To be clear: the main aim of this paper isn’t to necessarily convince readers of the 
truth of the contingent fundamentality thesis. Rather, I want to use this opportunity to explore 
the thesis – look at some reasons for thinking it true, some objections to it, and evaluate how 
it relates to other debates about the nature of fundamentality. In so doing, I hope to prompt 
further discussion – not only about the contingent fundamentality thesis, but about the 
relationship between modality and fundamentality more generally. 
 
§1. Preliminaries & Clarifications 
A good place to start is by clarifying what exactly the contingent fundamentality thesis is. As 
I understand it, the thesis isn’t meant to be the claim that every fundamental entity is 
contingently fundamental. This is too strong, as it seems there are some entities that are 
necessarily fundamental if fundamental at all – for example, assuming that Ø is fundamental, 
then it looks necessarily so. Similarly, if God exists, then she will likely be necessarily 
fundamental.  
 Relatedly, the thesis shouldn’t be necessitated, as in:  
 
NCFT Necessarily, for some x, x is fundamental and possibly, x exists and is not 
fundamental
2
 
 
                                                          
1
 For more on weak necessity, see Kripke (1971), Davies (1981), and Wildman (ms).  
2
 If you think that fundamentality only applies to facts, then replace ‘exists’ with ‘obtains’, and if you think 
properties can be fundamental, then add ‘is instantiated’. 
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This also seems obviously false, since it’s extremely plausible that everything that’s 
fundamental in an abstracta only world is necessarily fundamental; similarly for lonely God 
worlds – everything that’s fundamental there looks necessarily fundamental. 
 For these reasons, the proper formulation of the contingent fundamentality thesis is a 
possibility claim, along the lines of:  
 
CFT Possibly, for some x, x is fundamental and possibly, x exists and is not 
fundamental 
 
This gets at the main point – that is, that being fundamental isn’t a weakly necessary 
property.  Further, it also allows the contingentist a bit of wiggle room, in that, even if it turns 
out that all the actual fundamentalia are (weakly) necessarily fundamental, something like the 
contingent fundamentality thesis can still be true, provided there’s something out there in 
modal space which is contingently fundamental. 
 A second point that must be addressed concerns clarifying the metaphysical notion of 
fundamentality. As it happens, this is a fairly difficult task, for there are about as many 
different conceptions of fundamentality as there are authors writing about it – and there are a 
lot of authors. 
That said, the standard notion – or at least the one that most of the literature works 
with – roughly defines fundamentality in terms of metaphysical grounding. According to this 
standard conception, x is fundamental iff x exists/obtains and there is no y such that y 
grounds x. This account of fundamentality is discussed by, for example, Correia & Schnieder 
(2012), Rosen (2010), deRossett (2010), and Audi (2012).
3
  
A close, albeit distinct characterization comes from Schaffer (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c, 2013), who also defines fundamentality in terms of ‘grounding’, but might be better 
described as defining it in terms of ontological dependence. For Schaffer, x is fundamental iff 
x exists and there is no y such that x depends on y.
4
 
I take it that something along one of these two lines is what most have in mind when 
they talk of fundamentality. Yet these two certainly don’t exhaust the options! In fact, 
fundamentality has also been characterized in terms of: the ‘familiar theological metaphor: 
the fundamental entities are all and only those entities which God needs to create in order to 
make the world how it is’ (Barnes 2012: 484), truthmakers (Cameron 2008a, Heil 2003); 
structure (Sider 2011); what holds ‘in reality’ (Fine 2001); metaphysical explanation (Jenkins 
2013); and the ‘ineliminable’ (Raven forthcoming). It’s also been taken as a primitive, 
hyperintentional notion (Wilson 2014, forthcoming).
5
 
 Given this plethora of options, settling upon the ‘right’ conception of fundamentality 
looks like a daunting task, and one that, to be frank, falls well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Thankfully, little of what I go on to say hinges upon adopting any particular conception – 
from what I can tell, the following discussion remains much the same regardless of how you 
understand fundamentality. With that in mind, I’ll make do with a rough-and-ready 
characterization, which underlies both the standard and the Schafferian conceptions, that x is 
fundamental when it sits at the bottom of a hierarchy of ground/dependence, ‘grounding’ 
                                                          
3
 This account has also been criticized for being too broad, since there might be some entities that are 
ungrounded but not properly fundamental; see e.g. Dasgupta (2014a, 2014b).  
4
 See e.g. Steinberg (2015) for a discussion of how Schaffer’s idiosyncratic notion of ‘ground’ relates to both 
standard notions of ground and ontological dependence.  
5
 In fact, Wilson invokes several of these conceptions when she spells out her primitive notion: ‘The 
fundamental is, well, fundamental: entities in a fundamental base play a role analogous to axioms in a theory—
they are basic, they are ‘all God had to do, or create’. As such—again, like axioms in a theory—the fundamental 
should not be metaphysically defined in any other terms, whether these be positive or negative’ (2014: 560). 
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derivative things but being itself ungrounded. This is the notion of fundamentality that I’ll be 
working with. And this isn’t because I think this is the only viable conception or account of 
fundamentality – far from it! Rather, I hope that in formulating my characterization of 
fundamentality in such generic terms, I leave sufficient space for those with more specific 
notions to engage with the following discussion, modifying and adapting the details as 
required.  
 A third matter that must be addressed concerns what sorts of entities are (eligible to 
be) fundamental. And, much like with our previous question, lots of answers have been 
given; specifically, metaphysicians have suggested that ‘is fundamental’ can apply to truths 
(Williams 2010, Sider 2011), facts (deRosset 2010, Rosen 2010, Fine 2012, Audi 2012, 
Raven forthcoming), states of affairs (Armstrong 1997), concrete and abstract objects 
(Schaffer 2009, 2010c, Cameron 2008a), properties and relations (Lewis 1986, Armstrong 
1997), and logical operators/quantifiers (Sider 2011). In fact, one of the major differences 
between the standard and the Schafferian conceptions of fundamentality concerns what 
entities can be fundamental. Schaffer allows his notion of ‘grounding’ to apply to entities of 
any category – e.g. material objects, facts, properties, and events –that are at the bottom of his 
partially ordered hierarchy of being. Meanwhile, those who favour the standard conception 
tend to split Schaffer’s hierarchy into one characterized by ontological dependence, which 
relates entities of any kind but doesn’t necessarily result in a partial ordering, and a hierarchy 
characterized by metaphysical grounding, which mono-categorically applies to facts, and 
generates a partial ordering thereof.
6
 On this conception, ‘is fundamental’ primarily applies to 
facts – specifically, those facts that sit at the bottom of the grounding hierarchy, serving as 
grounds for other facts, but which are not grounded in anything. Entities from other 
categories are then said to be only derivatively fundamental, in that they feature in 
fundamental facts (alternatively, if they feature in fundamental facts of the form [x exists]).  
 While settling what the exact range of possible satisfiers for the ‘is fundamental’ 
predicate are is important, for present concerns I would prefer to remain as ecumenical as 
possible; in particular, I’d like to avoid making any clearly controversial assumptions about 
which sort of fundamentality statements are (or are not!) acceptable. Thankfully, we can skirt 
around the issue (and avoid stepping on anyone’s toes) by employing some terminological 
place-holders. Thus, when talking about the fundamentalia – be they facts, things, properties, 
or what have you – I’ll employ category neutral terms like ‘entity’. This allows those of us 
who are undecided about what kinds are eligible for being fundamental to continue 
discussing fundamentality’s modal strength, while also leaving ample room for those who 
have a horse in the race to slot in their preferred fundamental kinds where applicable. Further, 
when it matters, I’ll try to make it clear how to extend/apply the relevant point to whatever 
category is desired.
7
 
 One final point that must be discussed concerns whether being fundamental comes in 
degrees. Some have argued that entities can be more or less fundamental (and similarly more 
or less derivative). In contrast, others favour a ‘fundamentalist’ view, according to which 
fundamentality is instead an all-or-nothing thing.
8
 Which conception one favours – either 
fundamentality as quantitative or as non-quantitative – will entail reading the central question 
in a slightly different manner. First, if we understand fundamentality as purely binary (thus 
we adopt the latter, ‘fundamentalist’ view), then we can read the following discussion as 
concerning whether entities that are fundamental are necessarily so. But if we allow for 
                                                          
6
 See e.g. Fine (1995), Correia (2005), Schnieder (2006), and Lowe (2010) on ontological dependence, and 
Rosen (2010), Fine (2012), Raven (forthcoming) and Audi (2012) on grounding.  
7
 See fn2 for such an example. 
8
 See Barnes (2012: 875-9) for a useful comparison of the two views, and McDaniel (2013) for an excellent 
discussion of degrees of being. 
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degrees of fundamentality, then we’ve options: one can understand the matter as concerning 
all entities and their respective degrees of fundamentality (e.g., supposing that x is 
fundamental to degree n, could x be more or less fundamental?). Alternatively, one can focus 
just on the absolutely fundamental entities – those entities that possess fundamentality to the 
highest possible degree – and read the following as concerning whether these elite entities are 
necessarily elite (e.g., suppose that x is absolutely fundamental, could it be non-absolutely 
fundamental?). More generally, regardless of what one thinks about degrees of 
fundamentality, there’s a sensible version of the contingent fundamentality thesis in the 
vicinity.  
 So, we’ve said something about how best to formulate the contingent fundamentality 
thesis, what fundamentality is, what kinds of things are eligible for being fundamental, and 
what fundamentality is like (in particular, whether it comes in degrees). And, as I hope I’ve 
made clear, I am here trying to stay as inclusive as possible. This is partially because I want 
to avoid any unnecessary disagreements. But, more importantly, this is also because I think 
that, regardless of one’s position on these issues, the question of fundamentality’s modal 
strength is one that’s worth exploring. This is a (radically under-explored) point that everyone 
should say something about; that alone justifies adopting as neutral a position as possible. 
 
§2. For contingent fundamentality? 
 For all that, we might wonder why we should care about the contingent fundamentality 
thesis. What reasons are there for taking this particular view about the modal strength of 
fundamentality seriously?  
 The first reason for taking contingent fundamentality seriously is that structurally 
similar claims have been offered in other debates. For example, priority presentism is the 
view according to which (i) only present entities fundamentally exist, and (ii) past and future 
entities exist, but are grounded in present entities (Baron 2015, Lopez de Sa ms). So, on this 
view, Caesar might have been fundamental at the moment when he crossed the Rubicon, but 
he is derivative now.
9
 This temporally variable fundamentality thesis closely parallels the 
contingent fundamentality thesis.
10
  Similarly, several – in particular, Cameron (2007), 
Miller (2009) and Nolan (2005) – have argued for the contingency of composition, a view 
that nicely complements the contingent fundamentality thesis. 
 A second reason is that some individuals have apparently committed themselves to it. 
Specifically, priority monism is the view according to which the cosmos, the whole all 
concrete objects are part of, is the one and only concrete object that is not grounded in (or 
depends upon) any other object. This isn’t to say that the smaller parts don’t exist – they do! 
However, they do so derivatively, being grounded in the fundamental cosmos. Thus, in a 
quip, priority monism says that priority goes from (biggest) whole to part, not the other way 
around.
11
  
 In a recent discussion, Schaffer has suggested that the priority monist can allow for 
big-to-bigger embedding: take the cosmos c, which is actually fundamental, and embed it in a 
larger whole, c’. In the embedded worlds, c is grounded in c’. Consequently, things can cross 
the ‘categorical divide’ between ‘fundamental and dependent’ (2013: 81) – i.e., being 
                                                          
9
 Or, in terms of facts, [Caeser crossed the Rubicon] was, but is no longer, fundamental. Admittedly, while a 
rather important man, it’s not likely that Caesar is (or was) a fundamental entity. But this doesn’t take away 
from the point that priority presentism is committed to there being a host of entities which are fundamental at 
one time and derivative at another. 
10
 Further, if we assume that individual moments correspond to possible worlds, priority presentism entails the 
contingent fundamentality thesis. 
11
 Schaffer (2010c: 44) also claims priority monism is compatible with priority relations going from the cosmos 
to mereological atoms, then upwards from there to all the non-cosmos wholes; Steinberger (2015), however, 
raises some potent objections to this.  
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fundamental is, at least for cosmoi, a merely contingent property. Interestingly, shrinking 
cases also deliver the same result: take r, the sub-region of the cosmos that corresponds to my 
dog Ohle. In the actual world, r is derivative. However, there are (quite small!) worlds where 
r exhausts the whole of cosmos. And, in these worlds, since there is nothing larger than r – 
i.e., nothing that r is a proper part of – r is itself fundamental. Thus we’ve another case where 
fundamentality is a merely contingent property. 
 And there’s no problem squaring Schaffer’s apparent commitment to contingent 
fundamentality with his explicit endorsement of the necessity of monism (see e.g. Schaffer 
2010c: 56), provided we read the necessity of monism as being phrased in de dicto, not de re, 
terms – that is, every possible world w is such that, at w, the cosmos at w is fundamental, 
where ‘the cosmos’ is here used as a non-rigid definite description, picking out whatever 
thing happens to be the cosmos at w. This is perfectly compatible with some particular object 
a being the cosmos at w’ (and hence being fundamental at w’) but being a mere sub-region of 
the cosmos in (and hence derivative at) w’’. 
 Of course, priority monism does not entail contingent fundamentality – a priority 
monist could readily deny contingent fundamentality, perhaps because they endorse a kind of 
mereological essentialism, such that objects essentially stand in the mereological relations 
that they in fact do. This would block embedding cases – c essentially isn’t a proper part of 
anything, so whatever exists in the embedded world isn’t c – as well as shrinking cases – r 
essentially is a proper part of the cosmos, so the entity that is the mini-cosmos in the shrunk 
worlds isn’t r. But that doesn’t take away from the fact that the priority monist – Schaffer – 
seems to endorse contingent fundamentality, which is enough to indicate that it’s worthy of 
consideration. 
 Interestingly, the contingency of fundamentality is also compatible with priority 
pluralism, according to which there are at least two fundamental entities, neither of which are 
the cosmos. In fact, it can help the pluralist handle de re modal objections to their position. 
Suppose that Quarky is one of the actual fundamental entities. Assume that gunky worlds 
seem possible – that is, it’s possible that the material world is such that every object has 
proper parts. In the gunky worlds, Quarky looks derivative, grounded in its (infinite series of) 
proper parts. So, goes the objection, because Quarky fails to be fundamental in the gunky 
worlds, Quarky isn’t actually fundamental after all. However, if fundamentality is contingent, 
this argument doesn’t go through: that Quarky isn’t fundamental in gunky worlds says 
nothing about its fundamental status in the actual world.
12
  
 This highlights a third reason for taking contingent fundamentality seriously: the 
thesis might prove useful, in the sense that it can be helpful when it comes to deflating or 
avoiding objections to various positions, as in the previous paragraph.  
Taken together, this trio motivate at least giving the contingent fundamentality thesis 
the time of day. But that’s not to say that we’ve said enough to secure its truth! After all, 
there might be good reasons for dismissing it as implausible. With that in mind, the next 
section looks at several possible objections one might raise against the contingent 
fundamentality thesis. 
 
§3. Fundamentally mistaken about contingent fundamentality? 
                                                          
12
 Cameron (2007: 13) makes a similar point, but in a different context. Further, Schaffer seems to suggest that 
pluralists should take fundamentality to be contingent, when he says that ‘the pluralist who treats, say, a given 
electron as [fundamental] can grant that it may be divisible into small constituents, and then it would no longer 
(by her lights) be [fundamental]’ (2013: 81). One interesting area I hope to explore in future work is how 
contingent fundamentality relates to Schaffer’s (2010c) modal objection to priority presentism. 
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The first objection is that priority claims are metaphysical theses, and metaphysical theses 
are, if true at all, (metaphysically) necessarily true.
13
 Obviously, this would render the 
contingency of fundamentality a non-starter. However, there’s no reason to think that all 
metaphysical claims have such modal force. Perhaps the most famous example of a 
metaphysical thesis that is only intended to be contingently true is Lewis’s doctrine of 
Humean Supervenience. In this sense, the would-be contingent fundamentalist is in good 
company.
14
 
A more potent objection comes from the tight link between the structuring relations 
that characterize fundamentality and essence. For example, one might think that Socrates’s 
existence grounds the existence of {Socrates}, and that, if so, this explanatory link must 
somehow emerge from {Socrates}’s essence; it should, as Fine puts it, ‘be part of the nature 
of singleton Socrates that its existence is determined in this way from the existence of 
Socrates’ (2015: 279). More generally, it’s very plausible to say that it is part of the essence 
of derivative entities that they depend upon whatever it is they in fact do derive from.
15
  
 But this seems to conflict with contingent fundamentality. For suppose that Tommy 
the Atom is in fact fundamental, but only contingently so – possibly, Tommy’s existence is 
grounded in the existence of Quarky. If we grant the ground-essence connection, then 
Tommy essentially is grounded in Quarky. And, given that essentiality entails necessity, it 
follows that Tommy is necessarily so grounded. Yet, if Tommy is necessarily grounded in 
Quarky, he can’t be fundamental since being non-derivative is, at minimum, a necessary 
condition for being so. Consequently, assuming the ground-essence connection, it looks like 
we must reject contingent fundamentality. 
 An immediate contingentist response is to simply reject the ground-essence 
connection; however, such connections look extremely plausible, and it would be better to 
avoid such drastic measures if at all possible.
16
 With that in mind, a more measured response 
is preferable. Is there one? 
What’s problematic for the contingentist is if the relational property being derivative 
from Quarky is essential to Tommy; for this would entail that, in every world where Tommy 
exists, he’s derivative (and hence not fundamental). But what wouldn’t be a problem is if 
Tommy was essentially such that, if Quarky exists, Tommy is derivative from it. Tommy’s 
essentially – and hence necessarily – possessing this conditional property doesn’t prevent him 
from being fundamental in worlds where Quarky isn’t around.17 It does preclude Tommy 
being fundamental in worlds where Quarky also exists, but that’s fine – all we need to protect 
contingent fundamentality is a world where Tommy exists and is fundamental! 
 More generally, the contingentist can accommodate the ground-essence link by 
conditionalizing the relevant properties, such that x essentially is such that if y exists, then x 
depends upon it. Possessing these conditional essential properties preserves the ground-
essence link (it’s still part of Tommy’s essence that he’s derivative from Quarky whenever 
it’s around), but is also perfectly compatible with x being fundamental in worlds where y 
                                                          
13
 See e.g. Schaffer (2013: 84, 2010c: 56) and van Inwagen (2002: 28). 
14
 A related version of the objection says that the fundamental claims are necessary because they’re a priori. 
However, I take it that not all fundamentality claims are a priori – empirical investigation certainly plays a role 
in determining what is or is not fundamental. Further, as Kripke (1980) and Evans (1985) have shown, that 
something is a priori doesn’t mean it’s necessarily true.   
15
 Trogdon (2013) also argues for the grounding-essence link. 
16
 Though c.f. Fine (2012), Rosen (2010), and Skiles (2015) for some doubts about the essence-ground link. 
17
 Note that the use of conditional relational properties is just for convenience; the same point can be made using 
only relations. This ensures that sparse modalists about essence can make use of this manoeuvre too. For more 
on sparse modalism about essence, see Wildman (2013, forthcoming). 
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doesn’t exist.18 The upshot is that the essence-ground connection alone doesn’t tell against 
contingent fundamentality.
19
 
Admittedly, this conditionalizing move won’t be available to those who think that (i) 
the fundamental entities must be ontologically independent, and (ii) that an entity is 
ontologically dependent on whatever appears in facts about its essence. However, I see little 
reason to accept the latter – instead, I’d suggest that an entity ontologically depends on those 
things that both appear in facts about the entity’s essence and exist. This leaves room for 
contingent dependence (and hence contingent fundamentality), and is, I think, a close, 
contingentist friendly, surrogate for (ii). 
There is one potential draw-back to this conditionalizing move: it might turn out that 
it’s part of Tommy’s essence that, if the world was populated with some weird ectoplasmic 
goo, then Tommy is derivative from it.
20
 But, one might sensibly object, this simply isn’t part 
of Tommy’s essence – Tommy is in no way related to this weird goo! However, note that we 
only said this might be part of Tommy’s essence. Nothing said so far commits the 
conditionalizer to gooey-Tommy worlds, and hence to including such a property in Tommy’s 
essence (indeed, we might take our vitriolic response as a good reason for thinking there are 
no such worlds). In other words, not all conditional properties will make it into to Tommy’s 
essence. Of course, we’ll need some reason for including/excluding the relevant ones, but 
that’s a task at least partially to be determined by our epistemology of essence. And, until we 
can show that no conditional properties make it in, there’s space to maintain the 
conditionalizing reply. So it seems we can preserve the ground-essence link and still be 
contingentists about fundamentality. 
A third objection to contingent fundamentality concerns negative explanations.
21
 
Grant, for the sake of argument, that tables are derivative, but possibly fundamental. Now, go 
to any world where tables don’t exist. What explains the fact that there are no tables? The 
standard answer is something like the fact that there are no table-wise arrangements of 
simples. But, given that tables are possibly fundamental, this isn’t a complete explanation – 
after all, it might be that, even though there are no table-wise-arranged simples, some 
fundamental tables exist. Consequently, given contingent fundamentality, our explanations 
for the non-existence of entities is compromised. 
One line of reply is to say that it’s part of what it is to be a table that it be composed 
of tablewise-arranged simples – so, every table-world is also a table-arranged-simples-worlds 
– but still maintain that tables are possibly fundamental – that is, there are some worlds where 
tables exist and are fundamental, along with some worlds where tables are derivative. This 
would block the above objection, but at the cost of denying the idea that mereological 
structure mirrors priority structure, since it allows for mereologically complex objects to be 
fundamental.
22
 
An alternative response is to say that this is a specific instance of the more general 
problem of explaining negative facts, which is a complicated matter for anyone, contingentist 
or not. This looks enough to take the wind out of the objection’s sails, leaving it a problem – 
we need to say something to explain why there are no tables – but not a problem particular to 
contingent fundamentality. 
                                                          
18
 This existential conditionalization move isn’t available for someone who doesn’t allow for contingently 
existing fundamentalia, like either of the two ‘Fixed’ views discussed in §4. 
19
 A similar move blocks an objection from the internality of dependence/grounding: if we conditionalize the 
relevant dependence/grounding claims to those worlds where both the grounds and the ground exist, then we can 
preserve internality while allowing for contingent fundamentality.  
20
 Thanks to Alex Skiles for useful discussion on this and the following point. 
21
 Thanks to Tobias Wilsch for helpful discussion regarding this objection. 
22
 Such a move would likely appeal to priority monists. 
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We can make the final objection clearest via the theological metaphor. When she 
makes the world, what happens is that God sits down and then brings the fundamentalia into 
existence – everything then emerges from this fundamental basis. And, included within this 
derivative explosion, are the modal facts. But, if the modal facts emerge from the 
fundamentalia, then it’s nonsense to ask about the modal status of the fundamenta – the 
fundamental comes before modal matters even get going. On this conception, the 
fundamental are like Dasgupta (2014b)’s autonomous facts: they are the scaffolding that 
supports everything else. Or, to draw another metaphor, the fundamental are like axioms in a 
theory; asking about their modal status within said theory is to fail to understand the role they 
play in fixing what is or is not true therein. Thus the objection is that the notion of contingent 
fundamentality rests upon a complete misunderstanding of how fundamentality works. 
I must confess that I have a hard time wrapping my head around this objection. For 
one, those who are happy to advance it must commit themselves to modal gaps – that is, there 
are certain facts/propositions/things which are entirely amodal. That is, for lack of a better 
term, really weird. Further, it seems like we can make sense of contingent fundamentality: I 
can ask, of some object that is actually fundamental, ‘could this thing have been derivative?’ 
Nothing seems to have misfired there. For these reasons, I’m happy to set this objection 
aside, and progress onwards with exploring contingent fundamentality. To steal a line from 
Luther Ingram, if doing so is wrong, I don’t want to be right. 
The general upshot of this section is that the notion of contingent fundamentality 
doesn’t look entirely off-base. Admittedly, the above represent just a small sampling of the 
various objections one might offer against the idea. But their dismissal, combined with the 
points made in the previous section, give us a prima facie motivation for adopting the 
position.  
With that in mind, the next section examines how contingent fundamentality interacts 
with another point of intersection between modality and fundamentality: namely, the matter 
of whether contingently existing (or obtaining) entities can be fundamental. 
 
§4. Contingent fundamentality and contingent fundamentalia: shifting and shaking 
The necessitarian thesis says that the things that are fundamental necessarily exist – i.e., for 
all x, if x is fundamental, then x necessarily exists. In contrast, the contingentist thesis says 
that at least some of the fundamentalia contingently exist – that is, for some x, x is 
fundamental and possibly, x does not exist.
23
 So the necessitarian thesis makes necessary 
existence a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for being fundamental, while the 
contingentist thesis allows for some necessarily existing fundamentalia; it just denies that 
necessary existence is a necessary condition for being fundamental.  
So, how does commitment to either the necessitarian or the contingentist thesis 
interact with the contingent fundamentality thesis? There are four possible combinations. The 
first holds that the fundamentalia consist entirely of necessary existents, and that the 
fundamental necessarily existing entities are necessarily fundamental. In other words, this 
position accepts the necessitarian thesis, but denies contingent fundamentatliy. The second 
package also accepts that only necessary existents can be fundamental, but denies that being 
fundamental is a necessary property. Thus this view accepts the necessitarian thesis, but also 
accepts the contingent fundamentality thesis. Meanwhile, the final pair of packages both 
allow for contingently existing fundamentalia – that is, they accept the contingentist thesis – 
though they differ with regards to contingent fundamentality. The first denies contingent 
fundamentality, and holds that while the fundamentalita (can) include contingent existents, 
                                                          
23
 These theses are phrased in terms of existence, but they can be readily altered to accommodate those who, like 
Williamson (2013), think that all objects necessarily exist by e.g. changing ‘exists’ to ‘is concrete’. 
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whatever is fundamental is so in every world in which it exists. In contrast, our final package 
agrees that some fundamentalia contingently exist, but also claims that the grounding 
structure of the world is similarly fundamental – that is, this position endorses the contingent 
fundamentality thesis, and takes being fundamental to be a non-necessary property.  
We can make the various positions a bit clearer by thinking about them as four 
options emerging from the two distinctions. To apply some labels: the first distinction is 
between fixed vs shifty foundations – the fixer says that there aren’t any contingent 
fundamentalia, the shifter says there are. Meanwhile, the second is between firm vs shaky 
foundations – the firmer says fundmentality is weakly necessary, while the shaker says it 
isn’t. We can represent the various combinations with the following table: 
 
Fixed Firm 
 
Necessary fundamentalia that are necessarily 
fundamental 
Fixed Shaky 
 
Necessary fundamentalia that are 
contingently fundamental 
 
Shifty Firm 
 
Contingent fundamentalia that are (weakly) 
necessarily fundamental 
 
Shifty Shaky 
 
Contingent fundamentialia that are only 
contingently fundamental 
 
Are there any reasons to prefer any one of these package views over the others? Let’s start 
with Fixed Firm, which adopts the necessitarian thesis but denies the contingent 
fundamentality thesis. As far as I can tell, there’s nothing logically inconsistent about this 
view. However, that’s damning with faint praise, for the view faces some major problems. In 
particular, it is hard pressed to account for modal variation: if the fundamental entities are the 
same in every world – which is what this view is committed to – how can the various worlds 
differ concerning what exists/what these things are like?
24
 Suppose that A and B are the 
fundamental entities. On this view, they both necessarily exist and are necessarily 
fundamental. So, they exist and serve as the metaphysical foundation for every world. But let 
C be some merely contingent existent. C must be derivative from some combination of A and 
B. So, in worlds where C exists, it is grounded in (e.g.) A. But given that A is necessary, 
every world is an A-world. So why isn’t every world also a C-world? We might try to explain 
the A-but-not-C-worlds by appeal to the existence of some blocker D in those worlds, but that 
won’t help because D must also be derivative from some combination of A and B, and unless 
we want to say that D is necessary (which, if it’s a blocker for C, entails C can’t possibly 
exist), we’re stuck with the same problem as regards the existence of D. Without a 
satisfactory story to tell here, this package looks like a non-starter.
25
 
Similar points apply to Fixed Shaky that accepts the necessitarian thesis along with 
the contingent fundamentality thesis. Like its predecessor, this view too faces some 
significant difficulties. For one, it is unclear how it is any better placed with regards to 
resolving the modal variation explanatory challenge: while this view allows that the priority 
ordering of the worlds vary, this looks irrelevant when it comes to e.g. explaining the variable 
existence/qualitative nature of contingent entities like C. But there’s another problem specific 
to this view: the things that are eligible for being fundamental all necessarily exist, so all of 
them are available at all the worlds. However, the view also requires modal variation 
                                                          
24
 I suspect that worries along these lines are what motivate many to reject the necessitarian thesis in the first 
place. 
25
 One could salvage the position by saying there’s only one possible world; this avoids the problem at the cost 
of entailing that there is no modal variation, which is a clear case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
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regarding their priority ordering – e.g. it says that x is fundamental in w, but derivative in w’. 
Yet what explains this? What explains the different possible priority structures the worlds 
have?  
We can make this problem more acute by thinking about Shifty Shaky, which allows 
for contingent fundamentialia that are only contingently fundamental. This position can 
explain variation in priority structure in terms of variation in existence: x is derivative in w’ 
because y exists in w’ and, in that world, x depends upon/is grounded in y, while x is 
fundamental in w because y – the thing that x would depend upon – doesn’t exist in w. So 
Quarky the quark is fundamental in the actual world because there’s no gunk for Quarky to 
depend on, but in gunky worlds, Quarky depends upon – and hence is derivative from – a 
certain glob of gunk. Packages that are committed to the necessitarian thesis have no recourse 
to this kind of explanation. For them, everything that is possibly fundamental exists in every 
world, so we can’t explain priority variation in terms of existential variation.  
 While these problems aren’t insurmountable, they suffice to push us away from the 
two necessitarian views and into the waiting arms of the latter contingentist pair. But what 
might settle the difference between these two? 
 It seems to me that the key difference between these two packages will be 
disagreements over certain cases. For example, suppose that some object o is fundamental in 
world w, in part because, in w, o is mereologically simple – i.e., nothing is a proper part of o 
in w. Further, it’s natural to read this as an existential claim; that is, as something like, it is 
not the case that there exist some xxs such that they are proper parts of o in w. But nothing 
said so far precludes o’s existing in another world w’, wherein the xxs exist and serve as 
proper parts of o. Then, assuming that mereological structure and priority ordering are 
correlated, we get the result that o is merely contingently fundamental, since it is fundamental 
in w but non-fundamental in w’. Shifty Firm denies that such cases are possible. The closest 
one can come would be to have a qualitatively similar but distinct object o’, which is 
derivative in w’; however, you’d never get o itself, since it is necessarily fundamental. 
Meanwhile, as we saw above, Shifty Shaky embraces such cases. 
 So, should we allow for such cases? As far as I can see, the best case for rejecting 
them stems from certain essentialist assumptions – specifically, we think it essential to o that 
it be mereologically simple, and it is this which blocks the possibility of o-as-dependent-
worlds (or at least o-as-mereologically-dependent-worlds). However, the mereological 
essentialist assumption is questionable. Further, as we saw earlier (§3), the shifty shaker can 
agree to something like this essentialist assumption in the form of o’s essentially having a 
relevant conditional property like being mereologically simple provided the xxs don’t exist.26 
Consequently, we’ve prima facie reasons for being shift shakers over shifty firmers. Of 
course, there is more to be said here, but this suffices for a first pass. 
 
§5. Conclusions 
As stated at the outset, the aim here was to prompt further discussion of the so-far-neglected 
question of fundamentality’s modal status, which I have tried to initiate by exploring the 
contingent fundamentality thesis. In particular, I’ve focused on clarifying the essential ground 
work and specified my interpretation of the core thesis, offered a few points in favour of it, 
replied to some initial objections, and made a first pass at seeing how it relates to another 
pointin the intersection of modality and fundamentality.  
But this is just a rough, exploratory survey of a small part of the terrain – there are 
many further points to evaluate with regards to contingent fundamentality. We might, for 
                                                          
26
 It might be necessary to complicate the property, adding conditions beyond the mere existence of the xxs to 
include e.g. that they are arranged in such-and-such a manner. Such complications can be easily added without 
undercutting the main point. 
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example, wonder how it relates to debates about the necessitation of grounding relations.
27
 
Additionally, assessing what the contingentist can say about the modal freedom of 
fundamentalia would be interesting.
28
 The standard assumption seems to be that we’re free to 
combine the various fundamental entities in whatever way we like – that is, they are modally 
independent – but exactly how to square this with contingent fundamentality looks potentially 
problematic. Finally, it would be nice to have a proper argument for adopting the contingent 
fundamentality thesis, something that I’ve not given here (alternatively, formulating more 
objections/arguments against the thesis looks like a potentially fruitful area too). 
However, these are all projects for another day. For now, I hope that I’ve convinced 
some of my readers that the contingent fundamentality thesis – and, more generally, the 
matter of fundamentality’s modal strength – are points worth thinking about.29 
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